A given number of single-product oligopolists locate in one of two separate market-places, which consumers access at a cost. Firms set prices and the CES consumers choose purchases at one or both market-places. Firm agglomeration in one market-place produces positive profits because of product differentiation. But under various assumptions, geographical separation of firms produces prices analogous to homogeneous product Bertrand, and is "very competitive", the reverse of textbook Hotelling.
INTRODUCTION
The paper studies a situation where a given number of single-product oligopolists locate in one of two geographically separated market-places or centres. Consumers face fixed costs of accessing the market-places (e.g. transport costs) and have a taste for variety over the products available; so they must choose whether to buy at one or both of the market-places and how much of the goods available there to buy. Given the resulting consumer demands each oligopolist sets a price for the sale of their product (a la Bertrand), generating a 2-stage location-price game which can have various types of subgame perfect equilibria. In particular, at some parameters there is an equilibrium in which firms agglomerate in one centre because separation across the two centres induces consumers to buy from just one centre and is "much more competitive", in a precise sense and in a way which is the opposite of the standard textbook, and many other Hotelling (1929) models 1 . Our main objective is to explain, and elaborate on, this result.
A natural application is to the location of shops at out-of-town shopping centres.
Indeed our main model of consumer behaviour (section 2) is broadly that used by Stahl (1982 Stahl ( , 1987 in studies relating to the location of retail stores. We add CES preferences and a complete analysis of the resulting consumer problem, including the decision to buy at one or both centres. This allows (section 3) a full characterisation of pure strategy equilibria of the duopoly location-price game when consumers are homogeneous in all aspects, including access costs. Agglomeration of the two firms in the same centre is then the only equilibrium possibility, but of two types. Our main interest is type A agglomeration which occurs when goods are relatively substitutable, and because separation is "much more competitive". Type B agglomeration emerges when goods are more complementary, because consumers now buy at both centres when firms are separate, leaving prices unchanged but increasing access cost expenditures and reducing profits compared to agglomeration. Although consumers prefer type B agglomeration of firms to the alternative of geographical separation, the same is (at some parameters) not true of the type A agglomeration -a planner interested solely in consumer welfare and with powers to direct firm location may want to veto agglomeration in one centre to allow consumers to benefit from the extra competition of geographical separation.
The rest of the paper explores the type A equilibrium in various different contexts, starting with oligopoly (Section 4) and heterogeneous consumers (Section 5), and finishing (section 7) with variations on Gehrig's (1998) model of competing financial centres and Dudey's (1992) Cournot model; section 6 explains how our main model achieves the inversion of the standard Hotelling logic.
There are several oligopolistic location-price models which also provide explanations of agglomeration of firms. Many of these (e.g. Ben-Akiva et al (1989) , Gehrig (1998) , Stahl (1982 Stahl ( ,1987 2 rely on sufficient complementarity between goods, and have features more in common with our type B agglomeration. And in the standard monopolistic competition model agglomeration is accompanied by prices which are independent of firm locations (see Fujita et al. (1999) , again akin to type B agglomeration. Klemperer (1992) seems to be the closest analogue for our main focus, the type A agglomeration. In Klemperer's duopoly, the geographical separation
(1 firm at each centre) is given and firms choose whether or not to differentiate their physical product or "product line". Think of consumers as heterogeneously and bimodally located near the centres, with transport as the access cost. With identical product lines consumers buy from their local centre and prices may be high (no-one buys from both centres so firms have considerable local market power). With different product lines, the emergence of consumers who buy from both centres toughens competition, lowering prices and causing firms to "agglomerate", that is, to choose the same product line; they compete "head-to-head". In a sense our type A explanation of geographical agglomeration is dual to Klemperer's explanation of head-to-head competition. With homogenous consumers and given differentiated physical products or product lines our firms choose the same geographical location. With appropriate consumer heterogeneity and given separate geographical locations, Klemperer's firms choose the same product line.
CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR
There are two centres which can be thought of as located at the opposite ends (0 and 1) of the interval [0, 1] . N is the total set of firms, with n elements; subset N 0 (n 0 elements) is at 0 and N 1 (n 1 elements) is at 1 ( ). So goods are always gross (ρ > 0) but imperfect (ρ < 1) substitutes. Each consumer has income y to be spent on the n goods 3 and on the fixed costs of access to the centre(s). For consumer h, t 0h , t 1h and t 01h (> t 0h , t 1h ) are the costs of access to centre 0, centre 1 and both centres, respectively, leaving residual income (to be spent on the goods available at the accessed centre(s)) of m 0h = y -t 0h , m 1h = y -t 1h and m 01h = yt 01h , respectively.
Using the standard definitions of CES price indices for the two cent res separately, 
In the special case where all firms are located in one centre (N 0 = N, N 1 = ∅ say) the consumer problem is entirely textbook standard, generating the CES solutions of (2.1). Otherwise (n 0 , n 1 ≥ 1) the consumer problem becomes "non-convex" as they must decide whether to buy at centre 0, centre 1 or both. The optimum will be given by (2.1), (2.2) or (2.3) depending on which of 
Lemma 1
For the consumer problem when ,
there is a function g:
, w 1h ) then there are no prices at which consumer h buys from both centres, the unique optimal demands being given by (2. 
Proof The special case (n = 2) of Proposition 5 later. < Proposition 1 reveals the standard positive profit outcome of Bertrand competition when products are differentiated. Notice also that profits shrink towards zero as the differentiation disappears.
When the firms further differentiate the products by choosing separate locations (firm1 at 0, firm 2 at 1, without loss of generality) the price subgame is quite different and depends critically on the degree of substitutability (ρ). If ρ > g (w)(=g(w,w) for short) , we know from lemma 2(a) that consumers will buy from just one centre/firm, that offering the lower price, with indifference at equal prices. Assuming an equal split of the market when prices are equal, the price subgame is now equivalent to the classic, homogeneous product Bertrand game with the usual "Bertrand paradox" zeroprofit outcome:
Proposition 2 In the duopoly model with homogeneous consumers where ρ > g(w), the unique Nash equilibrium prices, profits and utilities in the price subgame when firms are geographically separated, are; 1 2 1 2 1; 0 ;
The immediate consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 is;
Theorem 1
In the duopoly model with homogeneous consumers where ρ > g(w), the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the location-price game has the 2 firms agglomerating at the same centre (leading to prices, profits and utilities of Proposition 1) because geographical separation causes consumers to buy from just one firm and is as if there is homogeneous product Bertrand competition and so zero profits for both firms.
We elaborate further on Theorem 1 in succeeding sections. For the time being somewhat imprecisely, we refer to the Theorem 1 equilibrium as "Type A agglomeration". First, however, the consequences of geographical separation are quite different from Proposition 2 when ρ < g (w) . From lemma 2(b) when prices belong to the cone p 1 /q 2 ∈ (f(ρ, w), f(ρ, w) -1 ) consumers buy at both centres leading to aggregate demands x i in (2.6) and corresponding payoffs. Apart from a change of m to M these payoffs are the same as in the agglomeration subgame, and the argument of Proposition 1 produces the following candidate Nash equilibrium (the unique candidate in the price cone) for the current subgame, which has the property that neither firm will wish to Nash deviate to prices that remain in the above cone; Clearly neither firm wishes to raise its price from this candidate value so that prices are outside the cone, since this firm then loses the whole market and gets zero profits.
However firm 1 (say), by lowering its price from the candidate equilibrium to
will capture the whole market and can attain profits arbitrarily close to:
If follows that the candidate in (3.1) is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the current subgame iff 1 1π π ≥ , an inequality which becomes:
We have the following. 
the unique Nash equilibrium prices profits and utilities in the price subgame when firms are geographically separated are given by (3.1).
and geographical separation when goods are relatively weak substitutes
lowers profits (without any affect on prices) since consumers still buy from both the separated firms, the extra access cost expenditure lowering profits.
Theorem 2 In the duopoly model with homogeneous consumers where
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the location-price game has the 2 firms agglomerating at the same centre (leading to prices, profits and utilities of Proposition 1) because geographical separation leads consumers to buy from both firms, with no effect on prices but lowering profits because of additional consumer expenditure on access costs.
The equilibrium in Theorem 2 is quite different from that in Theorem 1; we refer to it as "Type B agglomeratio n". Thus, so far, for any w > 1, if goods are strong substitutes (ρ large enough) we have a type A agglomeration equilibrium whilst if they are weak substitutes (ρ small enough) we have a type B agglomeration equilibrium. Conversely, the properties of g and h in Lemmas 1 and 3 show that they both possess inverses with domain (1, ∞), so for each ρ ∈ (0, 1) there will be Type A agglomeration if w is large enough (so the cost of accessing two centres is much larger than that for one) and Type B agglomeration if w is small enough. Either way there is a parameter gap between Types A and B, in which there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In the duopoly model with homogeneous consumers where
, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the price subgame when firms are geographically separated.
Proof
We know from Lemma 3 that the candidate equilibrium of (3.1) is not an equilibrium when h(w) < ρ, and that there is no other equilibrium in the cone p 1 /q 2 ∈ (f(ρ,w), f(ρ,w) -1 ). We now show there is no equilibrium outside this cone. Notice 
It is easy to check that
decreasing) to the right (resp.left) of ρ and
there is a unique ρ * ∈ (0, 1) where F(ρ * ) = 1 and so (4.2) is satisfied iff ρ ∈ (ρ * , 1);
The rest of the paper explores type A agglomeration in various different contexts.
OLIGOPOLY WITH HOMOGENOUS CONSUMERS
We start with oligopoly. To shorten exposition we assume an even number of firms 4 , so we have 4 ≥ n firms choosing to locate at one of the two centres. If all firms agglomerate at the same centre, the following generalisation of proposition 1 emerges;
Proposition 5 In the oligopoly model with homogeneous consumers, the unique Nash equilibrium prices, profits and utilities in the price subgame following agglomeration of all firms at the same centre are;
Proof. From (2.4) the payoff to firm 1 may be written; 
, where
Differentiating again and using the stationary point condition a = 0 gives;
Expanding the quadratic bracket and rearranging leads to [ ]
Since the left hand side is increasing in p i any Nash equilibrium must be symmetric.
Equating prices produces the required p i * which gives π i * when substituted into π 1 above, and v* when substituted into v oh in (2.1).
< Again because of the product differentiation, agglomeration produces positive profits,
Geographical separation of firms can now occur in many different ways, ranging from the case where all firms but one are in the same centre to the case where firm numbers are the same at each centre.
we know (lemmas 1(a), 2(a)) that in all these cases consumers never buy from both centres, the chosen centre being that with the lower price index which now in general depends on the size of the centres (n 0 and n 1 ) as well as prices. For instance suppose that 1 1 0 ≥ > n n and that p (q) is the uniform price at centre 0 (1). Then consumers are indifferent between which centre to buy
; to the larger centre has an advantage because of its greater variety -its prices can be higher than at the rival centre up to
and yet it retains the whole market. Because of this, and analogous to the usual treatment of homogeneous product Bertrand games with asymmetric marginal costs (to avoid non-existence problems), we assume that centre 0 gets the whole market when P = Q and n 0 > n 1 .
And with the same analogy, we exclude prices below their marginal cost from firms' strategy sets when n 0 > n 1 (to avoid implausible equilibria otherwise). The consequences for price subgames are as follows.
Proposition 6 In the oligopoly model with homogeneous consumers where ρ > g (w), the set of Nash equilibrium prices, profits and utility in the price subgame with geographically separate firms (n 0 ≥ n 1 ≥ 1) is;
(a) If n 0 > n 1 and assuming that centre 0 gets the whole market if P = Q and that firms strategy sets exclude prices below margined cost, (as in (a)(i)), taking the whole market in both cases. But then a small Nash reduction in price by some centre 1 firm will capture the market for centre 1 and be profitable.
(b) When n 0 = n 1 the entire market goes to centre 0 if P < Q, centre 1 if P > Q with equal shares if P = Q. The usual Bertrand reasoning ensures that the statement is the unique Nash equilibrium. < Part (a) (i) prevails if n 1 is sufficiently small rela tive to n 0 . In this case the smaller centre is so uncompetitive that it has no effect on the larger centre -the prices at the larger centre are those that would also emerge with n 0 firms at 0 and zero firms at 1.
The "within centre" competition at 0 produces prices at which the smaller centre cannot compete -even with q i = c, i∈ N 1 , centre 0 captures the whole market. As n 1 increases relative to n 0 , (a) (i) eventually gives way to (a) (ii) and margined cost prices at centre 1 do now restrain prices at the larger centre, to the level at which it just keeps the whole market. And when n 1 = n 0 we are back to the Bertrand paradox outcome, as in Proposition 2 for duopoly.
There is a homogenous product Bertrand parallel for all these subgames, not just when n 0 = n 1 . Define a 2 "firm" (0 and 1) homogenous but asymmetric product 
where:
Employing similar reasoning that used for part (a) of Proposition 6, one finds the equilibria;
The parallel is that if >0. Moreover for ρ ∈ (0,1) the sign of ∂F/∂ρ is the same as that of ρ -nln2/(n + ln2), and F (ρ, n) →∞ as ρ→ 0. This ensures that for each n there is a unique ρ ∈ (0,1), ρ* (n) say, such that F (ρ, n) < 1 iff
and F (ρ, n) -1 = 0, and since as n → ∞,
In terms of the shopping centre example, a town planner with interest only in the townsfolk welfare and with powers over the location of shops at two out-of-town shopping centres, may wish to exercise this power and force shops to spread across the two centres, against their wishes. Although each consumer will shop at only one centre, and lose some variety, the competition between centres will reduce prices to such an extent that consumers benefit.
CONSUMER HETEROGENEITY
In this section we argue that the type A agglomeration emanating from the severe competition of geographical separation is robust to small relaxations of the consumer homogeneity assumptions used in Sections 3 and 4, prior to relating our model to Notice that the heterogeneity has no effect on these profits -varying ε does not affect aggregate residual income and so does not affect aggregate demands. But these profits shrink to 0 as ρ→1, as usual.
(s(h)+1) and both centres (s(h)+2
Under geographical separation (firm 1 at 0, 2 at 1), and as in the last section, there are no prices at which h buys from both centres if 
There will be a symmetric equilibrium remains true for ε ∈ (0,ε*). On the other hand profits after agglomeration (proposition 7) exceed those under geographical separation for small enough, positive ε, ε ∈ (0,ε**) say where ε** > 0. Then for ε ∈ (0, min (ε*, ε**)) we have an agglomeration subgame perfect equilibrium in which profits after geographical separation shrink to 0 as ε→0. Thus for small enough heterogeneity the type A agglomeration remains in this approximate sense, exhibiting a required robustness.
The consumer welfare result (Theorem 3) is similarly robust. Fix ρ, y and t so that
. Then (Theorem 3), with ε = 0 there is type A agglo meration but consumers would prefer geographical separation of the firms. Now allow ε > 0. we know from the last paragraph that type A agglomeration continues in an approximate sense for ε ∈ (0, min (ε*, ε**)). All consumers would prefer geographical separation to this agglomeration if
v is given by proposition 7 and h ṽ by proposition 8. Some manipulation 6 shows that all these inequalities hold if
However when ε = 0 this inequality is equivalent to our assumed ρ > ρ* (see the proof of Theorem 3) and so continues to hold for positive ε which are small enough.
THE HOTELLING MODEL
There are essentially 3 differences between our duopoly model and the standard The consequences of these differences are extreme. In particular, the Hotelling 2-stage location-price game never has any kind of equilibrium in which firms agglomerate, since agglomeration now produces the Bertrand paradox zero profits, whilst geographical separation of the firms produces positive profits as the goods are then location differentiated for the heterogeneous consumers. The best-known positive result (D'Aspremont et al (1977) ) is that under quadratic transport costs the subgame perfect equilibrium has maximum geographical separation of the firms (one at 0, one at 1). In the remainder of this section we argue that each of the (a), (b) and (c) differences is needed for this turnaround.
The role of consumer homogeneity is that it is needed for the exact Bertrand parallels of type A agglomeration, creating the zero profits under geographical separation of sections 3, 4 and 5.1. The small Main Street heterogeneity of section 5.2 leads to small separation profits that shrink to zero as the heterogeneity disappears, leading to approximate type A agglomeration. The strength of our overall claims thus depends tautologically on the proximity to homogeneity, and weakens as Main Street heterogeneity expands.
Tastes for variety, or physically differentiated products, are also essential since they allow positive profits for agglomerated firms. Changing our assumption here to that of Hotelling would entail 1 = ρ , zero profits under agglomeration, and so agglomeration could never be an equilibrium in section 5.2. 
TWO FURTHER VARIATIONS
Our theme has been articulated in a m odel where firms compete in prices after locating in one of two centres, and where consumers buy a variety of goods, with full information. We have argued that competition between the centres can force firms into type A agglomeration. In this section we show that the argument carries over to two somewhat different settings. In section 7.1 consumers search a centre for their most desired good of which they wish to buy one unit (inelastically), and in section 7.2 firms compete in quantities at stage 2, generating a Cournot version of the previous Bertrand stories.
A search model
The model is Gehrig (1998) except that we replace his conventional assumptions (firms can locate anywhere on Main St. along which consumers are uniformly distributed) with the geography of section 4 (n firms to locate at 0 or 1, all consumers located at 2 1 ). Alternatively the model is that of section 4, changing the consumer aspect as follows. Consumers wish to buy inelastically just one unit of one (differentiated) good. With n 0 firms at 0 and n 1 at 1, it is assumed that the products available at each centre are symmetrically distributed around a "characteristics" circle of perimeter 1. Always now, consumers buy from only one centre, and realise their mo st preferred characteristic after arriving at the chosen centre. They then search the chosen centre for the firm offering the product closest to their ideal, and buy the one unit from that firm. Assuming that the realized ideal good is equally likely to be anywhere on the circle, and that the consumer cost of buying the best alternative available is composed of the travel cost ( 2 1 t for each centre, following Gehrig), the price paid and a search cost proportional (with a factor µ) to the circular distance between the ideal and the best available good, the full expected cost of buying from centre 0 (EC 0 ) and 1 (EC 1 ) is as follows, when p is the price at all firms in centre 0
and q is the uniform price at 1;
In each case the final term is the search cost. Clearly with uniform prices across both centres (p=q) consumers buy at the centre offering the greater variety. If a firm d∈N 0 (say) deviated to p d then EC 0 changes to (see Gehrig (1998) for derivations of (7.1)-(7.3)),
To investigate price consequences of alternative locations, start with the agglomeration case (without loss of generality N 0 = N, N 1 = ∅ ). Using π d above it is easy to derive the following subgame equilibrium prices, profits and consumer costs:
If n 0 ≥ n 1 ≥ 1 we would expect (following section 4) that, when n 0 is not too much bigger than n 1 , marginal cost prices would emerge at the smaller centre 1, and price at 0 would be the highest price at which EC 0 ≤ EC 1 . The appendix shows that this is the case when 6 / 5 ≥ ( )
, centre 1 is too small to affect centre 0 and the outcome is (see appendix for proof):
Everything is exactly analogous to section 4. Agglomeration at one centre is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. As firms disperse to separate centres the smaller centre is completely ineffective if it is very small ( )
, and prices and profits at the larger centre, and consumer costs, increase as n 0 falls in this range. When the smaller centre is not too small ( )
, it does restrain prices and profits at the larger centre, which decrease, as do consumer costs, as n 0 falls towards 2 1 n.
Consumer costs are minimized (so utility is maximized) with equal sized centres, again.
The intuition of section 4 carries over also. Competition between centres is fierce because as soon as consumers face a "one or the other" choice between centres, the centres behave like single firms in a homogeneous Bertrand duopoly. Gehrig (1998) invokes an externality argument instead for his heterogeneous consumer model -if a firm in one centre lowers price it attracts business from rivals in the same centre but also attracts business to the centre from the other centre. This externality is of course present here and in section 4, but cannot provide a satisfactory account of type A agglomeration in our model. Indeed when n = 2 the externality disappears completely, but the agglomeration remains.
A Cournot model
In our Bertrand models, firms choose locations at stage 1 and prices at stage 2, and consumers have full information on prices prior to accessing a centre and buying goods, which we can helpfully now think of as at "stage 3". 
It is straightforward to define payoffs in the stage 2 quantity subgame and show that they generate the unique equilibrium x 1 = x 2 = ( )
. So prices, profits and utilities are;
If firm 1 is at 0 and firm 2 at 1 and a fraction λ of consumers access centre 0, the rest at 1, then market clearing prices given quantities x 1 (>0) and x 2 (>0) are defined by λ(y -t)/p 1 = x 1 and (1 -λ)(y -t)/q 2 = x 2 A consumer at centre 1 gets utility (y -t)/p 1 which must be the same as for centre 2, (y-t)/q 2 -otherwise all consumers would shop at the same centre. Hence λ = x 1 /(x 1 + x 2 ) and the market clearing prices become p 1 =q 2 =(y-t)/(x 1 +x 2 ). Again it is simple to derive the unique quantity subgame equilibrium as x 1 =x 2 =(y-t)/4c, producing the prices, profits and utilities;
Hence, as in section 3, prices and profits are lower under separation than under agglomeration, and agglomeration is the subgame perfect equilibrium. When firms agglomerate the product differentiation produces relatively high prices and relatively large profits. When they separate it is as if the goods become perfect substitutes, lowering prices and profits, analogous to Section 3 but not as extreme, as usual with Cournot versus Bertrand. The behaviour of consumer utility is also completely analogous to the Bertrand case: if ρ is large enough consumers would prefer geographical separation of the firms. This indicates that there is a qualitatively similar Cournot argument to the earlier Bertrand, and so the earlier arguments are not an artefact due to the Bertrand specification. The Cournot agglomeration is quite different from that of Dudey (1990) , however, who essentially interchanges our stages 2 and 3. In that case a one-firm centre will behave monopolistically to its consumers (since they commit to the centre before quantities are chosen), so it gets no consumers and agglomeration equilibrium is again the result. Separation is then not an equilibrium since consumers expect small centres to be less competitive and do not use them.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper has shown how geographical separation of product differentiated oligopolists across two market-places can lead to fierce price competition, analogous to that of homogeneous product Bertrand models, whereas agglomeration of the oligopolists in one market-place allows the product differentiation to produce a more profitable outcome. This happens if consumers are relatively homogenous in their costs of accessing market-places and the differentiated goods are reasonably good substitutes so that consumers buy at only one market-place when firms are separated.
And when it does happen firms will choose to agglomerate in one market-place (type A agglomeration), although consumers may indeed prefer the fiercer competition and lower prices of two active competing market-places.
The type A agglomerative forces reverse those of the textbook Hotelling model, a reversal due jointly to the consumer homogeneity and tastes for variety (product differentiation), and to the "outside" firm locations. In the type A equilibrium, firms choose to co-locate geographically with given, different product lines and with, in particular, consumer homogeneity, whereas in Klemperer (1992) , firms choose the same product line given separate geographical locations and with now appropriate consumer heterogeneity.
Our main model has price competition, fully informed consumers and the out-of-town shopping example. However the main ideas emerge also with quantity competition, producing a Cournot agglomeration argument quite different from Dudey (1990) , and with consumer search, producing an alternative argument for financial centre agglomeration to Gehrig (1998) . In general terms the paper shows how competition between markets can be much more severe than competition within markets.
FOOTNOTES
1. Tirole (1989) provides an excellent textbook exposition.
2. The Stahl references are explicitly focussed on location of shops and provide our main model of consumer behaviour, but not all provide full evaluations of location-price equilibria; Stahl (1982) assumes fixed prices, for instance.
3.
Alternatively consumers have a Cobb-Douglas function over various CES subutility functions, one of which is defined over the set of goods N. y is then the (constant) budget share allocated to N.
4.
Qualitatively this makes no difference.
5.
In the terminology of Thisse (1986, see also 1992 ) the model is an "outside" location model -firms can locate only outside the given residential district. Our focus is completely different from their vertical differentiation analysis, where both firms are outside but on the same side of the consumer locations.
6. The graphs of h ṽ (piecewise linear) and , so the uniquely optimal demands are those of (2.1) (resp., (2.2)), with the borderline indifference claimed. 
